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of the federal act by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the
protection of the act to a purchaser where the misrepresentations sued on were
made neither by means of some interstate method of communication nor by
means of the mails, although the transaction came within the purview of the act
in other respects.28 This defect could be overcome by a provision that civil and
penal remedies shall be available for any misrepresentation made by any means
and in any connection with a sale of securities by means of interstate communication or of the mails.
But the securities selling industry probably would find exclusive control in
the federal government more distasteful than inconsistent state regulation. Furthermore, wide divergence exists as to what exclusive federal regulations should
contain. Therefore perhaps the most satisfactory solution that can be hoped for
would be the inclusion of provisions in the state acts requiring state administrative agencies to accept for their mechanical requirements copies of documents
prepared pursuant to the federal act, and requiring exercise of regulatory powers
on the basis of information therein.29
It seems likely that the zeal of the state courts for protecting state citizens
will cause these courts to follow the lead of the Virginia court in the present
case and take full advantage of the wide discretion given them in the International Shoe and Hoopeston decisions. Pending disposition of the present case
by the Supreme Court of the United States may settle the matter.30 As it stands,
in the absence of the suggested federal legislation or of specific exemptions in the
state acts, dealers in interstate securities transactions by mail, telephone or
telegraph probably will be forced to comply with the Blue-Sky Laws of every
state in which they have purchasers. The result will be the exercise by the states
of a significant portion of the power delegated to Congress by the Constitution
of the United States to regulate commerce among the states.3'

LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY: SUBSTANCE
OR PROCEDURE?
According to early maritime codes and the subsequent general maritime law,
the liability of a shipowner was limited to his interest in the ship.' But since the
nineteenth century decline of the general maritime law, diverse methods of com28 Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F. 2d 44 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
29Compare the present Indiana provisions. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, i933) § 25-836(cc).

30 Probable jurisdiction has been noted and the case transferred to the summary docket.
69 S. Ct. 1496 (1949).
3XU.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
z The Consolato del Mare, probably compiled by private individuals in the Middle Ages by
order of the kings of Aragon, "expressly limits the liability of the part owner to the value of
his share in the ship." The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894). This code eventually
"became the common law of all the commercial powers of Europe." 3 Kent Comm. zo; see
The Rebecca, 2o Fed. Ca's. 373, No. ir, 61g (D.C. Me., 1831).
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puting the limit have been developed in different countries Conflict-of-laws
problems have been the result. The solution of these problems may be found in
the application of choice-of-law rules which tell the forum whether it should decide a legal problem by its own law or by the law of some other jurisdiction.
However, even if the forum is referred to the law of another jurisdiction by its
choice-of-law rules, it will not apply that portion of the foreign law which is
classified for the purpose of conflict of laws as procedure. Whether limitation of
shipowners' liability should be classified as substance or procedure is the problem raised by the recent case of Black Diamond v. Stewarl.3 There an American
ship, while proceeding down the Schelde river in the territorial waters of Belgium, collided with a British steamer. The British ship sank with all her cargo
and her chief steward was killed. In backing away from the wreck it had caused,
the American ship damaged the bank of the Schelde. The United States as
owner and the Black Diamond Steamship Corporation as bareboat charterer,
upon being pressed with claims of approximately $i,oooooo and anticipating
the filing of more claims, brought a petition for a limitation of liability. If the
American limitation were to be applied, the petitioners' liability could be no
more than $i,ooo,ooo, the value of the ship.4 The petitioners insisted, however,
that their liability was limited by the law of Belgium, inasmuch as the tort occurred in Belgian waters and the general choice-of-law rule is that problems of
the law of torts are to be decided according to the law of the place where the alleged tort occurred. Under Belgian laws a shipowner's liability may not exceed
the product of eight British pounds sterling multiplied by the tonnage of the
ship, which in the case at hand would amount to $325,ooo. The matter at issue
in the appeal to the Supreme Court was the amount of the bond to be filed where
the applicable substantive liability limit was in doubt. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had thought that the amount of the bond and the applicable
liability limit bore no relation to each other.6 The Supreme Court, through Jus2 In addition to the growth of divergencies as to the kind of damage for which the shipowner's liability would be limited, the English aod Uniform Convention systems, both widely
copied, base the liability limitation upon the product of a constant sum of money multiplied by
the tonnage of the ship. For detailed studids of the different systems see 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 543 (294o); Kuhn, International Aspects of the Titanic Case, 9 Am. J.Int. L. 336
('9zs); Sprague, Limitation of Ship Owners' Liability, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 568 (2935); Maritime Law Association, Report on History and Present Status of Domestic and Foreign Laws
Concerning Limitation of Shipowner's Liability (1935); see also The Main v. Williams, i52

U.S. 122 (1894).
3336 U.S. 386 (1949).

R.S. § 4285, as amended 49 Stat. 1480 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § z85 (Supp. 1949).
sBelgium has ratified the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, signed at Brussels on
August 25, 1924.
6 The court of appeals found that the petitioners had "impaled themselves on the horns of
a dilemma." The dilemma arose in the following manner: The statute provides that "[t]he
vessel owner, within six months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with such owner
4
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tice Frankfurter, reversed the decision, remanded the case, and instructed that
"the question of what law governs the substantive limit of liability should be
determined upon remand in advance of the proof of individual claims." He left
to the lower court the determination of the proper law governing the substantive limit, saying that "if it is the law of Belgium that the wrong creates no
greater liability than that recognized by the Convention of i924, we cannot,
without more, regard our own statutes as expanding the right to recover.... If,
on the other hand, the Convention merely provides procedural machinery by
which claims otherwise created are brought into concourse and scaled down to
their proportionate share of a limited fund, we would respect the equally well
settled principle that the forum is not governed by foreign rules of procedure.
We leave open the choice between these opposing hypotheses. Nor do we mean
to imply that these apparently clear-cut alternatives are exhaustive."7
It would appear that justice Frankfurter has misstated the "well settled
principle" of the conflict of laws concerning substance and procedure, for these
terms as used in the conflict of laws are exhaustive alternatives. Had the correct
written notice of claim, may petition a district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability within the provisions of this chapter, as amended, and the
owner (a) shall deposit with the court, for the benefit of claimants, a sum equal to the amount
or value of the interest of such owner in the vessel and freight, or approved security therefore
... or (b) at his option shall transfer, for the benefit of claimants, to a trustee to be appointed
by the court his interest in the vessel and freight. . . ." Petitioners had argued that their
liability should be limited to $325,oo by application of the Belgian statute. They concluded
that although their ship was worth $r,oooooo they should only be required to put up a bond of
$325,000. Otherwise, they reasoned, the only result which would follow from any bond over
$325,000 would be excess profit for the bonding companies. The Circuit Court relied upon three
decisions: The Aquitania, 2o F. 2d 457 (C.C.A. 2d, 1927); Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Tug
Kevin Moran, 159 F. 2d 273 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947); The George W. Fields, 237 Fed. 4o3 (D.C.
N.Y., i915). These three decisions held that where aggregate claims against a shipowner can
by no possibility exceed the value of the ship, a proceeding under R.S. § 4285 would not lie.
The Circuit Court thought that the petitioners had impaled themselves upon the horns of a
dilemma because, "[i]f in fact the limit of all their liabilities is $325,000 and their ship is worth
$i,ooo,ooo, they have no right to commence such a proceeding as this at all, and are confined
to asserting their privilege as a defense to any suits which may be brought against them....
If on the other hand they are wrong and the liabilities may go beyond $325,000, on their own
argument the bond they propose is too small." United States v. Stewart, 167 F. 2d 308, 309
(C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
Justice Frankfurter was able to resolve the dilemma by reasoning that "a sum equal to the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in the vessel or freight," as used in R.S. § 4285,
means the substantive limit of the owner's liability. However, even though under Justice
Frankfurter's interpretation of the statute the petitioners could file the smaller bond if their

substantive limit of liability were below the vaIue of their interest in the ship and freight, in the
case at hand the applicable substantive limit was the issue in question. Justice Frankfurter
therefore required the Black Diamond Steamship Corporation to post a bond for the value of
the ship and freight, "not because § 4285 demands it, but as an exercise of its power to preserve
the status quo pending appeal." Black Diamond v. Stewart, 336 U.S. 386, 399 (1949). Justice
Jackson, dissenting, pointed out that "[o]ur statute is clear: § 4283 fixes the maximum liability
at ship plus freight and § 4285 sets the minimum security at the same figure. To provide any
other limit of liability or security is to rewrite both sections." Ibid., at 400.
7Black Diamond v. Stewart, 336 U.S. 386, 396 (i949).
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test for classifying foreign legal rules been applied, the problem of determining
the amount to which the liability of a shipowner may be limited would be
classified as one of substantive law. This result is supported by an analysis of
the theory of choice-of-law rules as accepted by leading modem authorities.8
Conflict-of-laws doctrines are based essentially on the concept of justice.
Laws are said to be just by a particular society if they correspond to the moral
and social value judgments which are held by that society. In almost every
society one of the most important of these value judgments is that men's
reasonable expectations ought to be fulfilled. Where the law differs from one
jurisdiction to another three special types of expectation reasonably arise. First,
since people often engage in transactions which have contacts with more than
one jurisdiction, they reasonably expect that legal controversies which contain
significant contacts with foreign jurisdictions will be adjudicated by the forum.
In the second place, people expect that the obligations arising from any event
will be adjudicated in a uniform way, no matter where the case may happen to
be litigated. Finally, people frame their expectations with reference to the legal
system with which their legal relationships have the most significant contacts at
the time of the event in question, and expect that the law of that jurisdiction
will govern those relationships.
Conflict-of-laws rules are an attempt to fulfill these expectations. The first
type was met by the development of modem jurisdictional rules. The last two
can be fulfilled only when courts will occasionally decide cases by the law of another jurisdiction. Choice-of-law rules lead to this result, for they tell the forum
to what law it should look to decide a particular legal problem. These rules are
applied by the court only after it has "characterized" the various legal problems
in a case, for choice-of-law rules are formulated in terms of particular legal problems. For example, to determine whether a defendant is liable for negligently
striking and injuring the plaintiff, a court would first classify the question as a
problem of the law of torts. To determine what law to apply to the case, the
court would then look to the choice-of-law rule for problems of the law of torts
and would find that such problems are decided according to the law of the place
where the alleged tort occurred. After the proper law has been selected for each
legal problem of the case, the court must then decide the extent to which this
law is applicable. In the vast majority of cases, all the significant contacts are
with the forum, and the court does not hesitate to apply the local law in its
entirety. For if it is just that the forum's law should apply to a legal problem, it
is just that the entire law of the forum should be used so that particular rules
will not be applied out of their context within the system. Likewise, if the
parties' justified expectations are dependent upon foreign law, that law, except
for choice-of-law rules, should be applied in its entirety. This enables the forum
8The analysis developed here is a synthesis of the views presented in the following works:
Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws c. iv (1942); Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study vol. 11, c. 27 (1947). See also Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 148 (1947);
Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L.J. 333 (1933).
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to achieve the same result as would have been reached had the case been litigated in the foreign jurisdiction.9
Three limitations, often confused in practice, may be placed upon this otherwise sweeping reference. First, a statute of the forum may have displaced the
otherwise applicable choice-of-law rules by declaring that regardless of the
significant contacts of the case the law of the forum is to be applied. Second,
where the forum does not wish to decide a case in a fashion entirely contrary to
local notions of justice, it may refuse to enforce the foreign law on grounds that
it would violate the public policy of the forum. This public policy may be found
embodied in a statute, in the case law of the jurisdiction, or merely in the judges'
interpretations of community sentiment. The third limitation arises insofar as
application of the foreign law would involve taking steps for which the forum's
courts are not organized or equipped. For example, if referred to French law
an American court would not be able to carry on the trial in the French language
as is required by French law and would properly refuse to enforce that rule.
When the forum refuses to apply a foreign rule of law on this ground, it classifies that rule as procedural and applies the corresponding rule of its own.
Otherwise, the foreign rule of law is classified as substantive and is applied by
the forum. It is obvious, therefore, that as used in the conflict of laws the words
substance and procedure are exhaustive alternatives.
Taken in its context in the Black Diamond case, Justice Frankfurter's statement that "the forum is not governed by foreign rules of procedure,"'' indicates
that he thinks the proper test for classification of a foreign legal rule as substantive or procedural lies in an analysis of the function of the rule in the foreign
legal system. However, no matter what the significance of the shipowner's
liability limit in the Belgian legal system, had the case been litigated in Belgium
the Belgian courts would have applied their own limitation, unless, of course,
under their choice-of-law rules, they would have been referred to some other
legal system. Likewise, it would be illogical for the forum to refer to foreign law
in order to achieve uniformity of decision and thereby to fulfill justified expectations of the parties to the dispute, and then refuse to apply a particular rule
of the forum law merely because the foreign jurisdiction for some reason entirely
unconnected with the case at hand classified its rule as procedural. It would be
equally illogical to classify a foreign rule as procedural merely because the
forum had previously labeled the type of rule as procedural for some purpose
unconnected with the conflict of laws.
It is important to note that when a court classifies a foreign rule as procedural, it is refusing to step completely into the shoes of the foreign courts.
9This is not to forget, of course, that a single case may have more than one legal problem
in it, and that consequently the forum may be referred to more than one foreign law. See
Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (i931), where the court failed to see this
problem. The case was criticized in 31 Col. L. Rev. 884 (1931); 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1138 ('93 x);
29 Mich. L. Rev. 1072 (i93i); 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 8o4 (i93i); 6 Wis. L. Rev. 103 (1931).
'0 336 U.S. 386, 396 (1949).

COMMLENTS
This refusal cannot be supported by any notions of justice relevant to the particular case at hand, because, by hypothesis, the court has looked to the foreign
law in order that the case might be decided in accordance with its "proper" law.
Thus, the forum ought to restrict the classification of problems as procedural as
much as is compatible with the effective administration of justice.
Turning to the problem of determining to what extent the limitation of a
shipowner's liability is a matter of substance or procedure, it follows that the
rule stating the maximum amount of liability should be classified as substantive
to the extent that the application of a foreign liability limit would not interfere
in any way with the smooth running of the American judicial machinery. It is
true that in every legal system the limitation of liability is part of a complicated
legislative scheme. But this should not be cause for hesitation since the distinction between the substantive and procedural rules within the statutes is quite
simple. The actual monetary limitation may easily be abstracted from all the
provisions which would interfere with those rules of the forum that indicate by
what steps the shipowner may obtain a liability limit. Thus the notices to be
sent and the various papers to be made out are part of the forum's machinery
which has been set up to handle this specific situation. Deviation from these
rules might indeed be inconvenient. Application of the actual monetary limit
itself, however, presents no such difficulties.
An analysis of the results of classifying the determination of the amount of a
shipowner's liability limit as procedural fortifies the above answer. If procedural, then the jurisdiction with the highest limit becomes a haven for claimants, while the jurisdiction with the lowest limit will become desirable to shipowners. The owner of a ship which has caused some damage races for a lowliability port. The claimant tries to catch the shipowner in a high-liability port.
Uniformity in this situation is impossible and the mere existence of such a race
should not be countenanced by any rational legal system. On the other hand, if
the limitation is substantive the rights and duties are fixed as of the moment of
the occurrence of the controversial event. This result is in accord with the
majority of continental European courts, which do not hesitate to apply the
foreign limitation of liability as a matter of substance. x
If the foregoing analysis is correct, The Titanic 2 should be re-examined. The
British ship Titanic on her maiden voyage from England struck an iceberg on
the high seas and sank. The owners petitioned for a limitation of liability in an
American court. The case of The ScotlandX3 previously had decided that foreign
shipowners could obtain a limitation of liability in American courts, and had
indicated by dicta that the law of the flag would govern the existence of the
owner's liability where the accident was on the high seas. Thus the question for
decision in The Titanic was whether British law applied to the limitation of
liability as well as to the existence of liability, or whether the American limita11Rabel, op. cit. supra note 8, at 353.
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tion of liability would govern irrespective of the law to which choice-of-law rules
would otherwise refer. Since the American statute has left the scope of its application unformulated, the Supreme Court had to resort to general principles.
justice McKenna thought that The Scotland authorized application of the
British limitation of liability. Although Justice Holmes, for the majority, reasoned that under the The Scotland the American statute should be applied, his
conclusion appears questionable. In The Scotland Justice Bradley had addressed
himself to different problems-whether British or American law governed the
existence of liability and whether a foreign shipowner could avail himself of the
American limitation of liability machinery.
So the problem remains: Upon what ground did The Titanic refuse to apply
the British limitation of liability, which by general choice-of-law rules would
have been applied? As previously stated, there are only three types of limitations upon an otherwise applicable reference to foreign law. Therefore, The Titanic must have held either that the American statute required that American
law be applied regardless of the otherwise applicable choice-of-law rule; or that
the application of the foreign limitation would be contrary to the public policy
embodied in the statute; or finally, that limitation of liability must be classified
as procedure.
The choice is not readily apparent. A study of The Titanic opinion and of a
similar case, Emery v. Burbank,4 decided nineteen years earlier when Holmes
was a judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, leads to the conclusion that
he did not have the distinctions clearly in mind. In both cases, faced with a
statute of undetermined scope, Holmes resolved the ambiguity in favor of
broad application without articulating an analytical argument. The Titanic may
perhaps best be explained by noting that Holmes failed to make any distinction
between the provisions of the limitation statutes which outline the steps to be
taken by a shipowner in obtaining a liability limit, and the substantive limit
itself. Faced with the choice of applying the British statute in its entirety or the
American statute, he would be naturally inclined to favor the American statute;
for American judicial machinery was not organized to take all the various steps
required by the British statute.
The Black Diamond case gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to choose
-in a sense has already forced the choice-between the three types of limitations. The Court appears to have rejected the view that the American statute
substitutes its provisions for the otherwise applicable choice-of-law rules, by
stating in the Black Diamond opinion that "if, indeed, the Belgian limitation
attaches to the right, then nothing in The Titanic stands in the way of observing
that limitation."' s By remanding the case and instructing the lower court to determine whether the Belgian limitation of liability is a matter of substance or
procedure, the Supreme Court has implicitly denied that The Titanic decided
that problem, and the Court has become implicitly aligned with the authorities
holding that The Titanic was a "public policy" decision. Yet it is difficult to conX4J63 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (t895).

s 3 3 6 U.S. 386, 395 (1949)-
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ceive that the American statute purports to declare that the enforcement of a
foreign limitation of liability would be offensive to our notions of justice, while
at the same time enacting a limitation of liability substantially like those of
foreign countries. If, on the other hand, the distinction is made between the
substantive limit of liability and the steps whereby this limit may be obtained
by a shipowner, the applicable policy arguments relevant to the conflict of laws
all are in favor of the restricted scope of the statute. If these policy arguments
and the correct conflict-of-laws theory were followed, the American courts would
apply the monetary limit of the American statute only when referred to that
statute by choice-of-law rules. But as matters now stand, insofar as The Titanic
limits the applicability of foreign limitation of liability statutes, it operates as
a last remnant of the idea that each nation should mete out the law of nations
as it interprets that law. This notion has long been repudiated and has been
superseded by the conflict of laws, a legal technique based upon a more realistic
appraisal of world conditions.' 6
LEGAL STATUS OF INFANT EN VENTRE SA MtRE
Traditionally the question of whether an infant can sue for injuries sustained
while en ventre sa m~rer through the negligence of others has been answered in
the negative.2 The principal reasons given for denying recovery have been:3
" A recent article in the Columbia Law Review agrees that The Titanic should be reexamined. Knauth, Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 Col. L.
Rev. 1 (1949). Concerning the Black Diamond case, the author notes that three different suits
are being brought against the owners. The British shipowners are suing in England, the cargo
owners are suing in the United States, and a wreck removal suit will be brought in Belgium.
He points out that if the United States and Great Britain both declare the limitation of
liability to be a matter of procedure, "the parties plaintiff, by artfully dividing their lawsuits
between these very three States (each of which has a statute limiting a shipowner's liability)
will actually circumvent the common policy declared by all three States, and may succeed
in recovering judgments aggregating over $2,ooo,ooo-or seven times the Belgian limitation
statute figure-and will presumably collect on those judgments." In Mr. Knauth's opinion
The Titanic will contribute to this result, although, "[tihe Court's ruling on the limitation
point has always been a matter of some doubt, and it may now be re-examined in the Merganser-Norwalk Victory litigation [the Black Diamond case]."
I The term "en ventre sa more" refers to a child still within the mother's womb.
2 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942); Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, t8 N.J. Misc.
429, 14 A. 2d 52 (194o); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (194o); Smith v.
Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. ioo, ig N.E. 2d 446 (1939); Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274
N.W. 710 (1937); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944
(z935); Stanford v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 65i, io8 So. 566 (1926); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
Co., z64 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (iSi6); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co., r54App. Div.
667, z39 N.Y. Supp. 367 (igi3); Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 28 L. R. Fr. 69
(i891). Contra: Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939) (on the basis of a California statute); Montreal Tramways
v. Leveflle, 119331 4 Dom. L.R. 337; Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App., 1923)
(published in 1949). See also notes 12 and 13, infra.
3See Judge Pound's opinion in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220. 133 N.E. 567 (192I), in
which he lists as reasons for denying recovery: i) lack of authority, 2) practical inconvenience

